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ABSTRACT 
BACKGROUND 
Opioid errors have the potential to cause significant patient harm. These high risk 
medications are used in high volumes in palliative care services to manage pain and other 
symptoms. Palliative patients are at greater risk of harm from opioid errors as they are 
generally older and taking numerous medications to manage multiple co-morbidities. 
Understanding factors contributing to opioid errors in inpatient palliative care services is a 
largely underexplored, yet essential, aspect of patient safety.  
OBJECTIVES 
To explore and identify the characteristics and associated contributing factors of reported 
opioid errors in palliative care inpatient services using a multi-incident analysis framework. 
DESIGN 
A multi-incident analysis of opioid errors reported over three years in two Australian 
specialist palliative care inpatient services. 
RESULTS 
A total of 78 opioid errors were reported. The majority (76%) of these errors occurred during 
opioid administration, primarily due to omitted dose (34%) and wrong dose (17%) errors. 
Eighty-five percent of reported errors reached the patient resulting in opioid under-dose for 
over half (59%) of these patients. Over one-third (37%) of errors caused patient harm which 
required clinical intervention. Error contributing factors included: non-compliance with policy; 
individual factors such as distraction; poor clinical communication systems; and workload.  
CONCLUSIONS 
This multi-incident analysis has provided initial insights into factors contributing to opioid 
errors in palliative care inpatient services. Further exploration is warranted to understand 
palliative care clinicians’ perspectives of systems, individual, and patient factors that 
influence safe opioid delivery processes.  
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BACKGROUND 
Medication errors in hospitals are common and occur at all steps of the medication delivery 
process.1 While most drugs have a wide margin of safety, ‘high-risk’ medicines can cause 
significant harm if incorrectly prescribed or administered, or if other systems errors occur.2, 3 
The error rate of high-risk medicines is not necessarily higher than with other medicines, 
however, the patient consequences of a high-risk medicine error can be catastrophic.3  
Opioids are one example of high-risk medicines frequently implicated in medication errors 
causing patient harm, including fatal outcomes.4-9 Opioids are widely used by palliative care 
patients to manage their pain, and other end-of-life symptoms.10-12 Palliative care inpatients 
are particularly vulnerable to medication errors, and adverse outcomes, primarily because 
they are likely to be: older,11 have multiple co-morbidities,13, 14 advanced illness,11 receiving 
numerous medications,15, 16 including multiple opioid administrations each day, and have 
longer lengths of stay.11 Each of these factors increases their risks of medication harms 
making medication safety an essential component of quality palliative and end of life care.  
A quarter of palliative care clinicians report medication errors occur frequently in the 
palliative care setting and consider them to be a leading cause of error.17 Medication safety 
with opioids has been identified as a palliative care patient safety priority.17-19 Despite the 
high volume of opioid use in this speciality,11 and the heightened risk of exposure to and 
harm from opioid errors in this patient population, medication errors with opioids in palliative 
care services is a relatively unexplored area of patient safety.19-21 
The aims of this study were to explore and identify the characteristics and associated 
contributing factors of reported opioid errors in palliative care inpatient services using a 
multi-incident analysis framework. 
METHODS 
Design: Multi-incident analysis study.  
Setting: Two adult palliative care inpatient services (‘service’) in metropolitan New South 
Wales, Australia. Both service 1 (n=43 beds) and service 2 (n=20 beds), provide complex 
end of life care22; and utilize a standardized, paper-based medication chart for opioid 
prescribing and administration.23  
Ethics: Approval to conduct the study was granted by the hospital and University Human 
Research Ethics Committees.  
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Data collection and analysis 
Data collection and analysis was undertaken in accordance with a multi-incident analysis 
framework (Figure 1).24 Multi-incident analysis enables the simultaneous reviewing of 
multiple clinical incidents with a common, pre-defined theme, to identify previously 
unrecognized patterns and/or trends in incident characteristics and contributing factors, 
which may not be apparent when incidents are investigated in isolation.24 Multi-incident 
analysis involves four distinct stages: 1) preparation for analysis (Stage 1); quantitative 
analysis of clinical incidents to understand the scope of the problem (Stage 2); qualitative 
analysis of incident data to determine incident contributing factors (Stage 3); and 
development of recommended actions based on study findings (Stage 4).24 This paper 
reports the results of Stages 1 to 3 of the multi-incident analysis framework. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
Figure 1: Multi-incident analysis framework employed for project 24 
Stage 1: Prepare for analysis 
A systematic literature review20 and series of workshops investigating clinicians’ perceptions 
of opioid errors was undertaken to explore the scope and impact of opioid errors in specialist 
palliative care services, and inform the analysis plan. Consultation with service managers, 
senior palliative care clinicians (medical and nursing), hospital pharmacists and quality and 
safety managers (‘site team’) at each service established the following inclusion criteria: 1) all 
clinical incidents reported via the services’ internal incident management system which 
involved: Schedule 8 opioids (‘opioids’); and 2) occurred in the inpatient palliative care 
service during the pre-defined timeline (January 1, 2013 – December 31, 2015). A clinical 
incident was defined as any unplanned event which causes, or has the potential to cause, 
harm to a patient, 4 and included ‘near misses’ (i.e., when an incident is intercepted before 
causing patient harm).25 
Stage 2: Understand what happened  
A custom dataset was created in consultation with the site teams to capture clinical incidents 
with opioids. Data was extracted by the services’ Quality and Safety team and provided to 
the external research team for analysis.  
Reported incidents were initially categorized by: problem type (e.g. prescribing) and opioid 
involved. The National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention 
(NCC MERP) taxonomy, was used to further categorize the opioid incident to provide a 
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descriptive overview of the problem type (e.g. wrong drug).26 The NCC MERP Index for 
Categorizing Medication Errors (‘index’) was used to describe the patient impact of the 
opioid error.27  
Differences in patient demographics between services were analyzed using Chi-square 
tests, test of normality and homogeneity of variance, and univariate one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) by General Linear Model. Descriptive statistics and percentage analysis 
were used to identify incident characteristics. Pearsons’ Chi Square and Correlation were 
applied to determine relationships between patient and opioid error characteristics. 
Quantitative data analysis was undertaken with the IBM SPSS Statistics V25 software 
package.  
Stage 3: Determine how and why it happened 
A case report summary was completed for each opioid incident, combining incident narrative 
from both the incident report and details of the incident documented in the patient’s medical 
record (‘incident summary’). Incident contributing factors, defined as circumstances or 
actions that may have played a part in the origin or development of the incident,28 were 
identified and classified according to the Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework29 
(‘framework’). This framework was specifically developed for application in a healthcare 
context, and identifies multiple levels of contributory factors to clinical incidents in 
accordance with a systems approach to patient safety.29-31 The framework comprises 20 
factor domains representing active failures (i.e. any failure in performance or behavior of the 
person in direct contact with the patient32), situational factors, (patient, individual, task or 
team) and latent factors (e.g. physical environment, training and education, policies and 
procedures) that influence patient safety.29  
 
Incident summaries were initially coded inductively to identify contributing factor themes and 
descriptive sub-themes. Contributing factor themes were then coded against the Yorkshire 
Contributory Factors Framework factor domains.29 Incidents coded as “active failures” were 
further categorized into slips, lapses, mistakes, and/or violations (Textbox 1).32 Violations 
were considered in the context of compliance with the State medication handling policy33 
which mandates general principles for medication charting/orders and safe medication 
administration, including scheduled/high-risk medications. Qualitative data was managed 
using the NVivo software package V10.2.1.  
[insert Textbox 1] 
Textbox 1: Definition of active failure types32 
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Stage 4: Develop recommended actions  
Development of service specific recommendations in collaboration with participating sites is 
currently in progress and will be reported elsewhere.  
RESULTS  
Incident characteristics  
A total of 78 opioid incidents met the inclusion criteria, with an equal number of incidents 
identified in each service (n=39), representing an incidence of 1.7 reported opioid incidents 
per 1000 occupied bed days. The majority of incidents involved patients with cancer (86%, 
n=63), admitted for symptom management (59%, n=43), and who died during their 
admission (70%, n=51). Patients had a mean age of 72.2 years (11.1) and mean length of 
stay of 23.3 ( 20.0) days (Table 1). Patients in Service 1 were significantly older than those 
in Service 2 (p=0.018), however length of stay between services was not significantly 
different with age as a covariate. No statistically significant relationships between patient 
characteristics and opioid error characteristics were identified.  
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 1: Patient demographics – clinical incidents with opioids   
 
All incidents fell into NCC MERP Categories B (error occurred, did not reach patient) to E 
(temporary patient harm, requiring intervention) (Table 2). The majority of incidents (85%, 
n=66) reached the patient. Clinical intervention was necessary for 42% (n=29) of patients 
following an opioid incident. Sub-optimal pain and/or symptom management as a result of an 
opioid under-dose was evident in 59%, (n=17) of patients.  
Signs and symptoms of opioid toxicity were noted in 41% (n=12) of patients following an 
opioid error. The majority (83%, n=10) of these patients required additional monitoring 
and/or medical review within the service due to the opioid over-dose, and one patient 
required oxygen. Administration of an opioid reversal agent was not required for any patient 
following errors leading to opioid over-dose.  
[Insert Table 2] 
Table 2: Patient outcome of clinical incidents 
 
Three quarters of incidents were due to administration errors (76%, n=59), with a smaller 
number of prescribing errors (19%, n=15) and near miss incidents (5%, n=4) reported (Table 
  7 
3). Nearly two-thirds (61%, n=40) of reported errors resulted in missed opioid administration 
(‘under-dose’). The most common administration errors were omitted opioid doses (34%, 
n=20), accounting for one-third of all administration errors, followed by wrong dose errors 
(17%, n=10). Prescribing errors were predominately related to medication charting errors 
(33%, n=5). Almost half of all errors occurred at times which coincide with peak medication 
administration and/or change of shift, namely between: 08:00-08:59 (13%, n=10); 20:00-
20:59 (13%, n=10); 14:00-14:59 (10%, n=8); or 22:00-22:59 (10%, n=8). 
Collectively, two-thirds of reported incidents involved hydromorphone (37%, n=29) or 
morphine (28%, n=22). The remaining errors involved fentanyl (15%, n=12), oxycodone (9%, 
n=7), methadone (6%, n=5), and oxycodone/naloxone (4%, n=3). Administration errors 
occurred most frequently with hydromorphone (34%, n=20), morphine (25%, n=15), and 
fentanyl (20%, n=12), whereas the majority of prescribing errors (n=9, 60%) involved 
hydromorphone.  
[Insert table 3] 
Table 3: Opioid incidents by problem type (N=78)  
Trends/patterns in opioid incident contributing factors  
Analysis of the 78 incident case report summaries identified four primary factor domains per 
the Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework29: i) active failures; ii) individual factors; iii) 
communication systems; and iv) staff workload (Table 4). For a number of incidents (n=8), 
multiple contributory factor domains applied. 
Active failures 
Active failures were identified in two-thirds (n=53) of reported opioid incidents, of which 42% 
(n=22) were violations, specifically, non-compliance with medication management policies. 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
Table 4: Opioid incident contributing factors categorized by Yorkshire Contributory 
Factors Framework domains29  
 
Active failures - violations 
Non-compliance was identified in three policy areas: safe medication administration, second 
person checks prior to administration, and medication charting. Violations of safe medication 
administration policy (n=14) included: failure to correctly document opioid administrations 
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(n=5); and failure to check medication charts between and during shifts (n=4). Failure to fully 
implement a second person check prior to opioid administration was noted in four incidents, 
and led to wrong dose or wrong route errors, all of which resulted in opioid overdose. Non-
compliance with medication ordering/prescribing policies was relatively infrequent (n=2) 
comprising medication charting errors only (Table 4). Two incidents reported challenges to 
practices when non-compliance with medication administration policy was identified. In both 
cases the nurse being challenged proceeded with the incorrect administration procedure and 
the challenging nurse reported the violation.  
Active failures – slips, lapses and mistakes 
Slips, lapses and mistakes collectively comprised half (51%, n=27) of active failures. Slips 
(n=11), and lapses (n=5) occurred more frequently during opioid administration processes 
(n=15, 94%), whereas mistakes (n=11) were predominantly identified in the prescribing 
process (n=8, 73%). Slips resulted primarily in wrong dose (n=3) and wrong drug (n=2) 
errors. All lapses resulted in omitted doses. Mistakes during prescribing comprised opioid 
conversion errors (n=3), wrong dose (n=3) and wrong drug (n=2) errors (Table 4).  
Individual factors 
Individual factors were identified as contributing factors by the notifier in 12% (n=9) of 
incidents. In one third of individual factors (n=3), staff workload also underpinned the 
incident. Inattention and/or distraction were the primary individual factors identified (n=4) 
followed by inexperience (n=3) and fatigue (n=2). All incidents linked with individual factors 
occurred during the opioid administration process. 
Communication systems 
Communication related factors were evident in 17% (n=13) of incidents, all of which resulted 
in opioid errors that reached the patient. Deficiencies were primarily identified in 
communication during clinical handover (n=8), and in written communication (n=5). Poor 
clinical handover caused dose omissions for multiple patients which adversely impacted 
patients’ previously well managed pain. Failure of medical staff to document and/or 
handover changes to route of opioid administration, also contributed to omitted doses. 
Nurses’ interpretation of written opioid orders was affected by ambiguous written orders 
(n=3), and poorly handwritten orders (n=2).  
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Staff workload 
Work environment factors at the time of the incident, such as increased workload due to 
staffing levels and/or high unit workload, were explicitly identified in 10% (n=8) of incidents, 
predominantly resulting in omitted doses. Multiple incident reports cited the ‘…busy nature of 
the ward’ as a contributing factor to opioid incidents, at times underpinning non-compliance 
with policy, such as failing to implement a two-person medication check. Increased workload 
contributed to opioid errors regardless of staff experience (Table 4).  
Error mitigating factors 
A number of incidents highlighted the nurses’ role in preventing opioid errors (Textbox 2). 
Nurses instigated additional checks of opioid orders that were considered ‘unusual’, for 
example, very high doses, by cross-referencing with what had been recorded as dispensed 
and administered in the drug register previously, before administering the opioid. Adherence 
to medication management policy, such as second person checks prior to administration, 
was noted in a small number of incident narratives (n=4) to have prevented errors from 
reaching the patient, or mitigated patient impact following an error (Textbox 2). 
[Insert Textbox 2] 
Textbox 2: Examples of error mitigating factors identified in incident narrative 
DISCUSSION 
This multi-incident analysis has provided valuable insights into the characteristics of, and 
factors contributing to, reported opioid errors in palliative care inpatient services. Opioid 
errors were primarily reported during the administration process, consistent with findings 
from other health care services.34-36 While none of the errors resulted in serious adverse 
events or death, opioid errors impacted adversely on patients’ symptom management, with 
almost half of patients affected requiring clinical intervention as a direct consequence of an 
opioid error, largely due to omitted dose errors. 
Local working conditions and clinical communication failures appear to play a role in 
facilitating opioid errors, however, the focus on contributing factors, in this multi-incident 
analysis, tended towards active failures. Active failures were most often due to violations, 
primarily during the administration process. Unlike slips and lapses, which are unintentional, 
violations are an intentional, behavioral choice.32 Given the number of opioid errors due to 
violations of medication management policy, clinicians’ attitudes towards routine use of high-
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risk opioids, and whether this fosters complacency related to policy adherence warrants 
further examination.37 Understanding the factors that prompt non-compliance with policy, 
and strengthening adherence to these policies, is essential to reducing opioid errors and 
patient symptom burden in palliative care inpatient services.  
Slips and lapses (skill based errors), were readily identified during the administration 
process, however, in-depth analysis was restricted, as information provided in the incident 
summary was often limited. Errors in prescribing were more likely to be knowledge based 
(mistakes), than a result of a slip or lapse. However, whether the errors were due to rule-
based, knowledge-based, or other mistakes,32 could not be determined from the incident 
summary. These deficiencies in the analysis, highlight the need to further explore the 
systems factors and/or conditions which prompt slips, lapses and mistakes throughout the 
opioid delivery process. Given both services utilized paper-based medication charts, the 
implementation of digital health solutions, such as electronic medication management 
systems and clinical decision support tools, which have been shown to reduce these error 
types,38 warrants consideration.  
Despite the predominance of active failures, several latent, or ‘systems’ factors contributed 
to opioid errors in this analysis. Similar to factors contributing to medication errors in other 
hospital settings,39-42 a combination of sub-optimal communication systems and local 
working conditions, directly contributed to, and/or facilitated opioid errors in specialist 
palliative care services. Poor clinical communication has been associated with increased 
administration errors of all drug types,39 as has the quality of written prescriptions.40 
Identifying opportunities to improve clinical handover, particularly when changes to opioid 
orders are made, and encouraging nurses to question and report ambiguous written opioid 
orders, are key considerations to address the clinical communication gaps identified in this 
study.    
 [Insert Figure 2] 
Figure 2: Opioid error contributing factors categories29, 32  
The relationship between clinical staff workload and rates of opioid error in specialist 
palliative care services warrants further investigation. Increased workload has been linked 
with higher rates of medication administration and prescribing errors in acute care settings.39, 
41, 43 In this analysis, high unit workload at the time of the incident was identified as an error 
contributing factor, reflecting the complexity of patient care and corresponding medication 
regimens in palliative care service provision.11 However, it could not be conclusively 
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determined if additional latent factors, such as management of staffing levels or patient 
scheduling, contributed to increased workload.  
Latent organizational and/or external factors, such as physical environment, scheduling and 
bed management, and/or external policy context, did not appear to contribute to error 
producing conditions in this analysis. However, further investigation is required to confirm or 
refute this finding. 
Beyond error contributing factors, the role of palliative care nurses in identifying and 
intercepting opioid errors was evident in the incidents reported. An important next step in 
addressing opioid errors in specialist palliative care services, is to better understand the 
factors that empower, or disempower, nurses to challenge opioid orders and practices they 
perceive to be incorrect.  
Also critical to addressing opioid errors in palliative care, is an understanding of palliative 
services’ safety and error reporting culture. While numerous guidelines and strategies exist 
to safeguard against opioid errors,2, 44, 45 exploring specific strategies palliative services have 
implemented to reduce opioid errors is essential to inform service recommendations. 
Similarly, the relationship between error reporting culture and whether the frequency and 
types of opioid errors reported reflects actual errors requires consideration. These factors 
cannot be ascertained from incident reports alone, rather, require input from clinicians and 
other stakeholders involved in patient and/or medication safety within palliative care 
services.  
Limitations 
This analysis reports opioid errors from two palliative care inpatient services in one 
Australian state and may not be generalizable. Medication incidents are consistently under-
reported46 and dependent on clinicians recognition that an incident has occurred, and their 
willingness to report the incident.47 While this study has provided initial insights into factors 
contributing to opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services, further research is 
necessary to confirm or refute the study findings.  
CONCLUSION 
In order to support safe opioid medication processes in inpatient palliative care services, it is 
essential to better understand the factors and conditions which may give rise to error, 
beyond the errors made by clinicians at the front line of medication delivery. This study has 
provided a starting point from which further exploration of the conditions which may underpin 
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active failures, and the latent factors impacting safe opioid delivery processes can be 
undertaken. An essential next step is identifying and understanding palliative care clinicians’ 
and service managers’ perceptions of factors contributing to opioid errors in their service, 
and the impact of service safety culture on opioid incident reporting. Strategies to minimize 
opioid errors and resultant adverse patient outcomes in specialist palliative care services 
can hence be developed, implemented and evaluated. 
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Figure 1: Multi-incident analysis framework employed for project 
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Textbox 1: Definition of active failure types32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Slip: failure to execute an action due to misdirection of a routine behavior (skill based, 
unintentional), e.g., drawing the wrong drug into an infusion.  
Lapse: failure to execute an action due to a lapse in memory, resulting in the omission of 
a routine behavior (skill based, unintentional), e.g., forgetting to administer a dose of 
regular analgesia. 
Mistake: an error originating from an incorrect thought process or analysis (knowledge or 
rule based, unintentional), e.g., ordering morphine for a patient with a known allergy to 
morphine. 
Violation: a deliberate deviation from rules, protocols, policies/procedures etc., 
(behavioral choice), e.g., failing to undertake a second person check before administering 
a high risk medicine. 
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Table 1: Patient demographics – reported clinical incidents with opioids   
Demographics  Service 1 Service 2 Total p-value 
 N=37 (100%) N=36 (100%) N=73 (100%) 
 
Gender Male 20 (54.1) 18 (50.0) 38 (52.1) 0.816 
Female 17 (45.9) 18 (50.0) 35 (46.7)  
Age 
(years) 
Mean (SD)  75.2 (10.9) 69.1 (10.6) 72.2 (11.1) 0.018 
Median (IQR) 76.0 (13) 71.0 (18) 74.0 (18)  
Cancer 
diagnosis 
Yes 29 (78.4) 34 (94.4) 63 (86.3) 0.085 
No 8 (21.6) 2 (5.6) 10b (13.7)  
Primary 
reason for 
admission 
Symptom 
management 
20 (54.1) 23 (63.9) 43 (58.9) 
0.329 
End of life care 8 (21.6) 4 (11.1) 12 (16.4)  
Pain control 5 (13.5) 6 (16.7) 11 (15.1)  
Respite 2 (5.4) 3 (8.3) 5 (6.8)  
Palliative rehab 2 (5.4) 0 0 2 (2.7)  
Length of 
stay 
(days) 
Mean (SD) 18.9 (14.1) 27.9 (24.0) 23.3  (20.0) 0.206* 
Median (IQR) 14.0 (21) 20.5 (26) 17.0 (23)  
Died 
during 
admission 
Yes 22 (59.5) 29 (80.6) 51 (69.9) 0.074 
No 15 (40.5) 7 (19.4) 22 (30.1)  
 
a Three patients experienced more than one incident during admission; two near miss incident were not linked to a specific 
patient in the incident report. b Other than cancer diagnosis: heart disease/failure (n=3), COPD (n=2), end stage renal disease 
(n=1), ischemia (n=1), motor neuron disease (n=1), pulmonary fibrosis (n=1), sepsis (n=1). 
*Adjusted with age as covariate. 
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Table 2: Patient outcome of clinical incidents 
 
National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting 
and Prevention Index error category26 
N=78 (100%) 
Category B - error occurred, did not reach patient 12 (15.4) 
Category C - error reached patient, no patient harma 15 (19.2) 
Category D - error reached patient, required monitoringb and/or 
interventionc to preclude harma 
16 (20.5) 
Category E - error resulting in temporary patient harma which 
required interventionc 
29 (37.2) 
Error reached patient - patient impact/outcome not documented  6 (7.7) 
a Harm: Impairment of physical, emotional, or psychological function or structure of the body and/or pain resulting from error.  
b Monitoring: observation or recording of relevant physiological or psychological signs. 
c Intervention: change in therapy or active medical treatment. 
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Table 3: Opioid incidents by problem type (N=78)  
Problem type Incident type Service 1 Service 2 Total 
N=39 (100%) N=39  (100%) N=78 (100%) 
Administration  Total 26 (66.7) 33 (84.6) 59 (75.6) 
Omitted dose 10 (38.5) 10 (30.3) 20 (33.9) 
Wrong dose 4 (15.4) 6 (18.2) 10 (16.9) 
Transdermal patch – 
missing or not removed 
- - 7 (21.2) 7 (11.9) 
Wrong patient 3 (11.5) 2 (6.1) 5 (8.5) 
Wrong drug 4 (15.4) - - 4 (6.8) 
Wrong route 1 (3.8) 3  (9.1) 4 (6.8) 
Syringe driver error 1 (3.8) 2 (6.1) 3 (5.1) 
Incomplete 
administration 
2 (7.7) 1 (3.0) 3 (5.1) 
Challenge – non-
compliance with policy 
- - 2 (6.1) 2 (3.4) 
 Clinical management 1 (3.8) - - 1 (1.7) 
Prescribing  Total 11 (28.2) 4 (10.3) 15 (19.2) 
Medication charting 4 (36.4) 1 (25.0) 5 (33.3) 
Opioid conversion error 3 (27.3) - - 3 (20.0) 
Wrong dose 2 (18.2) 1 (25.0) 3 (20.0) 
Wrong drug 2 (18.2) - - 2 (13.3) 
Illegible order - - 1 (25.0) 1 (6.7) 
Delayed order 1 (14.3) 1 (25.0) 1 (6.7) 
Near miss – 
arrested or 
interrupted 
sequence  
Total 2 (5.1) 2 (5.1) 4 (5.2) 
Wrong patient 2 (100) 1 (50.0) 3 (75.0) 
Wrong dose - - 1 (50.0) 1 (25.0) 
 Total 39 (100) 39 (100) 78 (100) 
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Table 4: Opioid incident contributing factors categorised by Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework domains29  
 
Contributory factor and 
domain29 (proximal to latent) 
N =78 (100%) Key Subthemes Incident example (from incident narrative) 
Active failures (proximal) 53 (67.9)   
Violation 22 (41.5) Non-compliance with 
medication 
management policy 
Administration error – missing transdermal patch: ‘Patient fentanyl 50mcg 
patch was due for change/administration. Nursing staff were unable to locate 
previous patch on patient for removal. The palliative care plan was signed to say 
that the patch was sighted on the morning shift on [date] but not the (previous) 
afternoon or night shift. Care plan states that fentanyl patches should be sighted 
on all shifts, had this occurred on the afternoon and night shifts the patch may 
have been identified as loose or missing sooner.’ ID_18 
Prescribing error – order not ceased resulting in wrong dose: ‘Whilst 
checking patient's syringe driver it was discovered that the contents of the syringe 
differed from the order given. There were two medication orders for a syringe 
driver, one had not been cancelled from the previous day when the next one was 
written. Order for [date] was hydromorphone 5mg, new order was hydromorphone 
6mg. The correct medication was reloaded on [date]. Contents of incorrect syringe 
driver discarded. The Medical Officer has been advised to be sure to cancel 
orders when another is written.’ ID_49 
Slip 11 (20.8)  Administration error - wrong drug: ‘Hydromorphone 2mg subcutaneous given 
at regular drug round instead of morphine 2 mg subcutaneous. I discussed this 
error with the two nurses involved. Both are experienced in palliative care nursing 
and both understand the difference in strength between the two drugs. Neither 
could offer an explanation for the error.’ ID_42 
Prescribing error – wrong dose: ‘Rechart of medications done, oxycodone 
40mg bd re-charted (unintentionally) as oxycodone 40mg d, with 0800 the only 
time entered. No oxycodone given at 2000 on [date].’ ID_21 
Mistake 11 (20.8)  Prescribing error – wrong dose: ‘Patient had been taking 4/24 9mg oral 
morphine, yesterday this was changed to bd 60mg MS Contin. Medical staff had 
made an error in calculating dosage when changing MS Contin, however, as the 
dosage was within the normal range of MS Contin given frequently in the unit this 
was not picked up, and the higher dose was given on two occasions.’ ID_41 
Lapse 5 (9.4)  Administration error – omitted dose: ‘During regular drug round, noted three 
doses of regular 4/24 10 mg oral morphine had not been given overnight. Nurses 
on shift unable to explain or recall why dose omitted, other than agreeing that 
morphine not given.’ ID_56 
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Contributory factor and 
domain29 (proximal to latent) 
N =78 (100%) Key Subthemes Incident example (from incident narrative) 
Could not be determined 4 (7.5)   
Situational factors 9 (11.5)   
Individual factors 9 (100) Inattention/distraction 
Inexperience 
Fatigue  
Administration error – wrong drug: ‘Regular subcutaneous morphine 10 mg 
due, subcutaneous hydromorphone 10 mg given instead. The incident was 
discussed with the nurses concerned who are both experienced palliative care 
nurses. They stated they had given several subcutaneous hydromorphone 
injections prior to this patient and did not pay sufficient attention to this (patient’s 
medication order).’ ID_43 
Patient factors 
Nil identified 
  
Task characteristics    
Team factors   
Local working conditions 8 (10.3)   
Staff workload 8 (100) Staffing levels at time 
of incident 
High unit workload 
Administration error – omitted dose: ‘Patient stated this morning that nocte 
Oxycontin 70 mg had not been administered. Oxycontin PM dose not signed for in 
medication chart. Patient requiring 1 x breakthrough subsequent AM. Reviewed 
roster - 3 x staff had taken sick leave, with 1 x hospice casual and 1 x Permanent 
RN on the PM shift (sick leave replaced with 1 x Agency RN & 1x agency EEN).’ 
ID_31 
Administration error – wrong drug: ‘Suspected wrong drug used in 
subcutaneous infusion pump – morphine instead of fentanyl. Two regular staff 
involved in incident, neither staff member had a history of medication errors. Ward 
extremely busy at time of incident with more than normal requirements of 
breakthrough analgesia required for multiple patients.’ ID_19 
Equipment and supplies 
Lines of responsibility 
Management of staff and 
staffing levels 
Supervision and leadership 
Nil identified 
Latent organisational factors – nil identified 
Physical environment 
Policies and procedures 
Scheduling and bed management 
Support from central functions 
Training and education 
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Contributory factor and 
domain29 (proximal to latent) 
N =78 (100%) Key Subthemes Incident example (from incident narrative) 
Latent external factors – nil identified  
Design of equipment and supplies 
External policy context 
Applies across all factor 
types (proximal to latent) 
13 (16.6)   
Communication systems 13 (100) Poor clinical handover 
Written communication 
Administration error – omitted dose: ‘Patient seen by Medical team at 1600 
[date]. Subcutaneous infusion pump (SCIP) ordered and team handed instruction 
over to afternoon shift nursing staff. Team noted in progress notes that patient  
was a high falls risk and should be transferred to different bed. Nursing staff failed 
to hand over instructions regarding SCIP order to Pt's accepting nursing staff and 
as a result the SCIP was not commenced. At 0200 night staff found the SCIP 
order and commenced same.’ ID_34 
Administration error – transdermal patch not removed: ‘Patient presented to 
unit with fentanyl patches insitu. Medical review indicated that the patient was 
becoming intolerant to fentanyl and was rotated to another oral opioid, however nil 
documentation in progress notes of request to remove fentanyl patch noted. 
Found to still have patches on body when there was a verbal order to remove. On 
review of medication chart, order to remove patch was written over initial order, 
the modified request is unclear.’ ID_20 
Administration error – wrong dose due to poorly written order: ‘(Nurse A) and 
I gave patient subcutaneous hydromorphone at 1000. When I went to give 
another dose later, Nurse B checking it with me said that the order was 5 mgs to 6 
mgs. Nurse A and I had given 3mgs for the dose before instead of 5 mgs as we 
read the order as 3 mg. It was a new (as-required/PRN) re-chart and Nurse B 
knew it was 5 mg from the previous order, and the patient was generally having a 
6 mg dose.’ ID_39 
Safety culture Nil identified 
Multiple 8 (10.2)   
• Active failure: violation 
• Situational factors: 
individual factors 
• Local working conditions:  
staff workload 
8 (100) Non-compliance with 
medication 
management policy 
Fatigue 
High unit workload 
Administration error – wrong dose: ‘At 2300 patient was given 20mg 
breakthrough of oxycodone instead of 10mg. The wrong strength of medication 
was taken out of the cupboard and used. The shift was busy and the medication 
was not checked correctly against the order as outlined in the policy. Was also 
night shift and staff were fatigued.’ ID_30 
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Textbox 2: Examples of error mitigating factors identified in incident narrative 
Nurses’ role in preventing opioid error: 
‘Patient was admitted to ward from [external service], according to the 
medical discharge summary and medication chart from [external 
service], patient was on regular hydromorphone 0.75 mg per oral q4h, 
however, regular hydromorphone 7.5 mg per oral q4h was ordered by 
doctor. Nurse A and I double checked the dose given at [external 
service] and advised doctor who corrected the order on the 
medication chart.’ (ID_54)  
Adherence to medication management policy: 
‘When checking patient to locate the fentanyl patch on the afternoon 
shift, patch was found to be missing. Medication chart indicated that 
patch had been applied to Right side of patient’s chest. On the 
morning shift (of the same day), per the patient’s care plan, fentanyl 
patch had been checked and recorded to say it was insitu. Nurses 
contacted the morning shift who confirmed patch was insitu on 
patients right chest when showered that morning. Medical staff 
notified and a stat order given to replace fentanyl patch. Fentanyl 
patches are sighted and recorded on the patients care plan each shift 
this is an example of how well this process works, the patient didn’t 
suffer unnecessary pain as the missing patch was identified quickly.’ 
(ID_04) 
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Figure 2: Opioid error contributing factors categories 
 
 
